Vodafone 2013 Annual Report Download - page 77

The remuneration package for the 2014 nancial year
Opportunity Performance metrics Changes in year
Salaries are reviewed annually and xed for 12months
commencing 1 July. Decision is inuenced by:
level of skill, experience and scope of responsibilities
ofindividual and business performance, economic
climate and market conditions;
increases elsewhere within the Group; and
ofsimilar size and complexity to Vodafone, and is
25companies and a few other select companies
any nancial services companies.
There are no proposed salary increases for any executive
directors during the 2014 nancial year compared to a
salary increase budget in the UK of 1.75%.
a Vittorio Colao £1,110,000
a Andy Halford £700,000
a Stephen Pusey £575,000
None. No change during the year.
Benets
dened contribution pension scheme or to receive a cash
allowance inlieu of pension.
Chauffeur services, where appropriate, to assist with
theirrole.
The cash payment or pension contribution isequal to 30%
of annual gross salary. From 6 April 2011 contributions into
the dened contribution pension scheme wererestricted
to£50,000 per annum. Any residual of the 30% pension
benet is delivered as a cash allowance.
a £19,200 per annum.
a £1,500 per annum
None. No change during the year.
Global Short-Term Incentive
Plan (‘GSTIP’)
delivery of performance over the one-year
The three nancial metrics are designed to
focusing on improving operating efciencies.
Performance over the nancial year is measured against
stretching nancial and non-nancial performance
targets set at the start of the nancial year.
The annual bonus is paid in cash in June each year for
performance over the previous nancial year.
a Bonuses can range from 0–200% of base salary, with
100% paidfor on-target performance. Maximum is only
paid out for exceptional performance.
a Service revenue (25%);
a EBITDA (25%);
a adjusted free cash ow (25%); and
a competitive performance assessment (25%).
This is an assessment encompassing both net
promoter score and market share against the
competitors in each of our markets.
Weighting changed for
adjusted free cash ow (20% to
25%) andcompetitive
performance assessment (30%
to 25%)
Global Long-Term Incentive
Plan (‘GLTI’) base awards and
co-investment awards (further
page76).
ofsustained performance over the
long-term.
ofpersonal nancial commitment.
The use of free cash ow as the principal
capital discipline to our investment decisions,
whilst the use of TSR along with the three
Long-term incentive base awards consist of performance
shares which are granted each year in June/July.
Individuals must co-invest Vodafone shares and hold
vestingdate.
a The Chief Executive’s full award will have a target face
value of237.5% of base salary. The award for the other
executive directors will have a target face value of 210%
ofbase salary.
a Minimum vesting is zero times and maximum vesting is
three times the target award level.
a To receive the full target award, executive directors must
co-invest up to their annual gross salary. If they are
unable to commit up to their annual gross salary, awards
will be reduced accordingly, to a target base award of
137.5% (CEO) and 110% (other executive directors).
a The awards that vest accrue cash dividend equivalents
over the three year vesting period.
a Awards vest to the extent performance conditions are
satised over the three year period.
a Performance over three nancial years is
measured against stretching targets set at the
beginning of the performance period.
a Vesting is determined based on a matrix of
two measures:
a adjusted free cash ow as our operational
performance measure; and
a relative TSR against a peer group of
companies as our external performance
measure.
The peer group has been
expanded to include AT&T.
75 Vodafone Group Plc
Annual Report 2013
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