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Corporateresponsibility
TheDeepwaterHorizonexplosionandsubsequentspillhadmajorhuman
andenvironmentalconsequences,demonstratingtheimportanceofsafe
andresponsibleoperations.Wedeeplyregretthelossoflivesandinjuries
suffered,andtheimpacttotheenvironmentandlivelihoodsoflocalpeople.
Wearecommittedtounderstandingandapplyingthelessonsfrom
theaccident.Already,wearemakingsomefundamentalchangesinthe
wayweoperate.
Thesemeasuresinclude:
• Thecreationofanenhancedsafetyandoperationalriskfunctionthatis
independentofthebusinesslineandisrepresentedineveryBP
operation.
• Thereorganizationofourupstreambusinesstocreatethreefunctional
divisions,eachreportingdirectlytothegroupchiefexecutive.(See
Exploration and Production on pages 40-41 for further details.)
• A reviewofemployeerewardframeworkstoincreasethefocuson
performanceinsafety,compliance,andoperationalriskmanagement.
(See Employees on page 74 for further details.)
• Anexaminationofhowwecanstrengthentheoversightofcontractors.
Strengtheningthesecoreareaswillrequiresomeprofoundchangesinhow
weoperateandwilltakeseveralyearstofullyembed.
In2010,thecompanyreported14workforcefatalities,includingthe
11workersontheDeepwaterHorizonintheUSandthreeotherwork-
relatedfatalitiesintheNetherlands,GermanyandCanada.All14individuals
werecontractors.Wedeeplyregretthelossoftheselivesandrecognize
thetremendouslossfeltbytheirfamilies,friendsandco-workers.
Safety
Gulf of Mexico oil spill investigations and recommendations
IntheimmediateaftermathoftheDeepwaterHorizonexplosion,BP
launchedaninternalinvestigation,drawingontheexpertiseofmorethan
50technicalandotherspecialistswithinBPandtheindustry.The
investigationteamwasledbyBP’sheadofsafetyandoperations,and
workedindependentlyfromBP’sotherspillresponseactivitiesand
organizations.
TheBPinvestigationconcludedthatnosinglecausewas
responsiblefortheaccident.Theinvestigationinsteadfoundthata
complex,inter-linkedseriesofmechanicalfailures,humanjudgements,
engineeringdesign,operationalimplementationandteaminterfaces,
involvingseveralcompaniesincludingBP,contributedtotheaccident.
SeeGulfofMexicooilspillonpages34-39.
Asaresult,theinvestigationteammade26recommendations
specictodrilling,whichweacceptedandareimplementingacrossour
worldwidedrillingoperations.Therecommendationsincludemeasures
toimprovecontractormanagement,aswellastostrengthendesignand
assuranceonblowoutpreventers(BOPs),wellcontrol,pressure-testing
forwellintegrity,emergencysystems,cementtesting,rigauditand
verication,andpersonnelcompetence.
SeveralexternalinvestigationsintotheDeepwaterHorizonaccident
andresponseareunderwayintheUS,includingthosebytheMarine
Board,theNationalAcademyofEngineering,theChemicalSafetyBoard,
theUSCongress,theDepartmentofJusticeandtheSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommission(SEC).Inaddition,thePresidentialCommission
issueditsreporton11January2011.Seepage38inGulfofMexicooilspill
forasummaryofthendings.Asthendingsoftheseinvestigationsare
madepublic,wewillmakethemavailableonwww.bp.com/gulfofmexico.
Subsequent actions to date to strengthen BP’s safety management
Followingtheaccident,BPimmediatelyundertookavarietyofactivitiesto
furtherstrengthenitsoilspillprevention,containmentandresponse
capability.Theseinclude:
• BOPsusedonBP-operatedprojects,alongwithotherwell-control
equipment,werecheckedtoconrmthattheyhadbeenproperly
maintainedandarecapableofshuttinginthewellinanemergency.
• Remotelyoperatedvehicleswereconrmedtobecapableofactivating
BOPsinemergencysituations.
• Newdecisionmatrix,designedtoaidkeydecisionsonwelldesignand
operations,wasdevelopedanddistributedtoouroperationsglobally.
• TwocontainmenthatsweredeliveredtotheUKtoaidNorthSea
containmentcapability.
• W eupdatedouroilspillresponseplan,andsubmittedittothe
USDepartmentoftheInterior.
Meanwhile,ourupstreamteamsareworkingtoimplementthe26
recommendationsmadebyBP’sinternalinvestigationteam.Thesewillbe
trackedinthequarterlyHSEandoperationsintegrityreportsuppliedtothe
executiveteam.
Safety and operational risk
Safetyandoperationalriskmanagementrequirements,encapsulatedby
ouroperatingmanagementsystem(OMS),aresetbyacentral,dedicated
function,withperiodicreviewsbytheboardandexecutivecommittees.
Theoperationaldeliveryoftheserequirementsistheresponsibilityof
thebusinesses.
AsaresultoftheGulfofMexicoincident,BPhasredenedand
strengthenedthescopeandaccountabilitiesofthegroupfunctionfor
safetyandoperations,creatinganewindependentfunction,Safetyand
OperationalRisk(S&OR).WearedeployingS&ORprofessionals,manyof
whomwerepreviouslyreportingtolocalbusinessleaders,inallofBP’s
operationsthroughout2011.
ThecoreresponsibilitiesofS&ORareto:
• Providechecksandbalancesindependentofthebusinessline.
• Strengthenmandatorysafety-relatedstandardsandprocesses,
includingoperationalriskmanagement.
• Provideanindependentviewonoperationalrisk.
• Assessandenhancethecompetencyandcapabilityofourworkforcein
mattersrelatedtosafety.
TheheadofS&ORisamemberofBP’smostseniorexecutiveteamalong
withtheheadsofReningandMarketing,andExplorationandProduction.
S&ORoverseesandauditsthecompany’soperationsaroundtheworld,
assuringthatalloperationsarecarriedoutinlinewiththegroup’sOMS.
Whilethebusinesslinecontinuestobeaccountableforoperational
delivery,S&ORholdstheauthoritytointerveneinsafetyandoperational
riskaspectsofBP’stechnicalandoperationalactivities.
Governance processes
Theboard’ssafety,ethicsandenvironmentassurancecommittee(SEEAC)
receivesupdatesfromtheexecutiveteam’sgroupoperationsrisk
committee(GORC),whichischairedbythegroupchiefexecutive.These
updatesincludequarterlyreportsmonitoringmajorincidents,near-misses
andperformanceinbothprocessandpersonalsafetyacrossthegroup.
ThegroupchiefexecutiveandtheheadofS&ORattendSEEACmeetings
andreportonthegroup’ssafetyperformance;thisismeasuredthrough
developingleadingandlaggingsafetyindicators.SEEACalsoreceives
informationdirectlyfromS&OR,otherpartsofthebusinessandexternal
sources,includingtheindependentexpertappointedtomonitorthe
implementationofrecommendationsmadebytheBPUSReneries
IndependentSafetyReviewPanelfollowingthe2005incidentatour
TexasCityrenery.
SeeBoardperformancereportonpages90-105forfurther
informationontheactivitiesoftheboard’scommittees,including
theGulfofMexicocommitteeestablishedtooverseetheworkofthe
GulfCoastRestorationOrganization(GCRO).
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