DHL 2012 Annual Report Download - page 212

Long-Term Incentive Plan   for members of the Board
of Management
Since  July , the members of the Board of Management
receive  s under the  Long-Term Incentive Plan. Each 
under the   entitles the holder to receive a cash settle-
ment equal to the dierence between the average closing price of
Deutsche Post shares during the last ve trading days before the
exercise date and the issue price of the .
e members of the Board of Management each invested
  of their xed annual remuneration (annual base salary) as a
personal nancial investment in . e number of  s issued
to the members of the Board of Management is determined by
the Supervisory Board. Following a four-year waiting period that
begins on the issue date, the  s granted can be fully or partly
exercised within a period of two years provided an absolute or
relative performance target is achieved at the end of the waiting
period. Any  s not exercised during this two-year period will
expire. To determine how many – if any – of the granted  s can
be exercised, the average share price or the average index is com-
pared for the reference period and the performance period. e
reference period comprises the last  consecutive trading days
before the issue date. e performance period is the last  trading
days before the end of the waiting period. e average (closing)
price is calculated as the average closing price of Deutsche Post
shares in Deutsche Börse ’s Xetra trading system.
e absolute performance target is met if the closing price of
Deutsche Post shares is at least , ,  or   above the issue
price. e relative performance target is tied to the performance
of the shares in relation to the  Europe  Index ,
 . It is met if the share price equals the index
performance or if it outperforms the index by at least  .
A maximum of four out of every six  s can be “earned”
viathe absolute performance target, and a maximum of two via
the relative performance target. If neither an absolute nor a relative
performance target is met by the end of the waiting period, the
 s attributable to the related tranche will expire without replace-
ment or compensation. More details on the   tranches are
shown in the following table:
 
2008 tranche 2009 tranche 2010 tranche 2011 tranche 2012 tranche s
Issue date 1 July 2008 1 July 2009 1 July 2010 1 July 2011 1 July 2012
Issue price in  18.40 9.52 12.27 12.67 13.26
Waiting period expires 30 June 2011 30 June 2013 30 June 2014 30 June 2015 30 June 2016
e fair value of the  Plan and the Long-Term Incentive
Plan   was determined using a stochastic simulation
model. As a result, an expense of  million was recognised for
nancial year  (previous year:  million).
See Note . for further disclosures on share-based pay-
ment for members of the Board of Management. A provision for the
  and the  Plan was recognised as at the balance sheet
date in the amount of  million (previous year:  million), of
which  million was attributable to the Board of Management.
 Related party disclosures
. Related party disclosures (companies and Federal Republic
of Germany)
All companies classied as related parties that are controlled
by the Group or on which the Group can exercise signicant inu-
ence are recorded in the list of shareholdings, which can be accessed
on the website, www.dp-dhl.com/en/investors.html, together with
information on the equity interest held, their equity and their net
prot or loss for the period, broken down by geographical areas.
Deutsche Post  maintains a variety of relationships with
the Federal Republic of Germany and other companies controlled
by the Federal Republic of Germany.
e federal government is a customer of Deutsche Post 
and as such uses the company’s services. Deutsche Post  has
direct business relationships with the individual public authorities
and other government agencies as independent individual custom-
ers. e services provided for these customers are insignicant in
respect of Deutsche Post ’s overall revenue.
   
KfW Bankengruppe (KfW) supports the federal government
in continuing to privatise companies such as Deutsche Post 
orDeutsche Telekom . In , KfW, together with the federal
government, developed a “placeholder model” as a tool to privatise
government-owned companies. Under this model, the federal gov-
ernment sells all or part of its investments to KfW with the aim of
fully privatising these state-owned companies. On this basis, KfW
has purchased shares of Deutsche Post  from the federal gov-
ernment in several stages since  and executed various capital
market transactions using these shares. KfW placed a   package
of Deutsche Post  shares on the market at the beginning of
September , reducing its interest in Deutsche Post ’s share
capital. KfW’s current interest in Deutsche Post ’s share capital
is . . Deutsche Post  is thus considered to be an associate of
the federal government.
Deutsche Post DHL Annual Report 
208