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34
Ourofficersanddirectorsexertsubstantialinfluenceoverus.
AsofJanuary25,2010membersandformermembersofourBoardofDirectorsandourexecutiveofficers,
togetherwithmembersoftheirfamiliesandentitiesthatmaybedeemedaffiliatesoforrelatedtosuchpersonsor
entities,beneficiallyownedapproximately43.3%ofouroutstandingcommonshares.Accordingly,these
shareholdersmaybeabletodeterminetheoutcomeofcorporateactionsrequiringshareholderapproval,suchas
mergersandacquisitions.Thislevelofownershipmayhaveasignificanteffectindelaying,deferringorpreventing
achangeincontrolofGarminandmayadverselyaffectthevotingandotherrightsofotherholdersofour
commonshares.
Provisionsinourshareholderrightsplanandourcharterdocumentsmightdeter,delayorpreventathirdparty
fromacquiringusandCaymanIslandscorporatelawmayimpedeatakeover,whichcoulddecreasethevalueof
ourshares.
OurBoardofDirectorshastheauthoritytoissueupto1,000,000preferredsharesandtodeterminethe
price,rights,preferences,privilegesandrestrictions,includingvotingrights,ofthoseshareswithoutanyfurther
voteoractionbytheshareholders.Thiscouldhaveanadverseimpactonthemarketpriceofourcommonshares.
Wehavenopresentplanstoissueanypreferredshares,butwemaydoso.Therightsoftheholdersofcommon
sharesmaybesubjectto,andadverselyaffectedby,therightsoftheholdersofanypreferredsharesthatmaybe
issuedinthefuture.Inaddition,wehaveadoptedaclassifiedboardofdirectors.Ourshareholdersareunableto
removeanydirectorortheentireboardofdirectorswithoutasupermajorityvote.Inaddition,asupermajority
voteisrequiredtoapprovetransactionswithinterestedshareholders.Shareholdersdonothavetherighttocalla
shareholders’meeting.Wehaveadoptedashareholders’rightsplanwhichundercertaincircumstanceswould
significantlyimpairtheabilityofthirdpartiestoacquirecontrolofuswithoutpriorapprovalofourBoardof
Directors.Thisshareholders’rightsplanandtheprovisionsinourcharterdocumentscouldmakeitmoredifficult
forathirdpartytoacquireus,evenifdoingsowouldbenefitourshareholders.
TheCaymanIslandshaverecentlyintroducedprovisionstotheCompaniesLaw(2009Revision)tofacilitate
mergersandconsolidationsbetweenCaymanIslandscompaniesandnonCaymanIslandscompanies.These
provisions,containedwithinPartXVIoftheCompaniesLaw(2009Revision),arebroadlysimilartothemerger
provisionsasprovidedforunderDelawareLaw.
Therearehoweveranumberofimportantmaterialdifferencesthatcouldimpedeatakeover.First,the
thresholdsforapprovalofthemergerplanbyshareholdersarehigher.Thethresholdsare(a)ashareholder
resolutionbymajorityinnumberrepresenting75%invalueoftheshareholdersvotingtogetherasoneclassor(b)
ifthesharestobeissuedtoeachshareholderintheconsolidatedorsurvivingcompanyaretohavethesamerights
andeconomicvalueasthesharesheldintheconstituentcompany,aspecialresolutionoftheshareholders(being
75%ofthosepresentinpersoninpersonorbyproxyandvoting)votingtogetherasoneclass.
Asitiswouldnotbeexpectedthattheshareswouldhavethesamerightsandeconomicvaluefollowinga
takeoverbywayofmerger,itisexpectedthatthefirsttestistheonewhichwouldcommonlyapply.Thisthreshold
essentiallyhasthreerequirements.First"amajorityinnumber"oftheshareholdersmustapprove;secondlysuch
majoritymusthold75%"invalue"ofalltheoutstandingsharesandthirdlytheshareholdersmustvotetogetheras
oneclass.
Secondlytheconsentofeachholderofafixedorfloatingsecurityinterest(inessenceadocumented
securityinterestasopposedtoonearisingbyoperationoflaw)isrequiredtobeobtainedunlesstheGrandCourt
oftheCaymanIslandswaivessuchrequirement.
ThemergerprovisionscontainedwithinPartXVIoftheCompaniesLaw(2009Revision)docontain
shareholderappraisalrightssimilartothatasprovidedforunderDelawarelaw.Suchrightsarelimitedtoamerger
underPartXVIanddoapplytoschemesofarrangementasdiscussedbelow.