Tesco 2008 Annual Report Download - page 29

Tesco PLC Annual Report and
Financial Statements 2008 27
The Committee considers TSR performance against the FTSE 100 and a
comparator group of international retailers that includes Ahold, Carrefour,
J Sainsbury, Metro, Morrisons, Safeway Inc, Target and Walmart.
In order to motivate short-term performance and delivery of success in
the start-up phase of the US business, the Committee agreed last year
to increase the potential short-term bonus opportunity for the US CEO,
Mr Mason, from 100% to 150% of salary in cash and an equal amount
in deferred shares. Mr Mason’s total short-term opportunity is subject to
a combination of Group and US-specific performance conditions. In order
to incentivise and reward early stage success against financial and strategic
milestones for new business ventures, the potential opportunity under the
share element of the short-term bonus for the Group CEO, Sir Terry Leahy,
was also increased last year from 100% to 150% of salary (with his potential
cash bonus opportunity remaining at 100%). The additional awards to
Mr Mason and Sir Terry Leahy are subject to performance conditions which
measure the successful progress of the US business including leadership
and delivery of financial and strategic objectives and factors such as site
acquisitions, store openings, agreed capital expenditure, infrastructure,
early turnover and financial milestones for returns from store openings.
Share awards will continue to be deferred for three years before release.
Following the Remuneration Committee’s consideration of the extent to
which the various performance measures in respect of the 2007/8 award
have been achieved, the Executive Directors have been awarded 90%
of the cash element and 83% of the deferred shares element of that part
of their annual bonus which is measured by reference to Group targets.
In addition, Mr Mason has been awarded 90% of the cash and deferred
shares elements of that part of his annual bonus which is measured by
reference to US-specific targets, and Sir Terry Leahy has been awarded
90% of the deferred shares element of that part of his annual bonus
which is measured by reference to US-specific targets.
Performance Share Plan
The Performance Share Plan (PSP) provides the opportunity to earn
rewards for achieving superior long-term performance. By ensuring a focus
on longer-term business success and encouraging the Executive Directors
to build up a shareholding in the Company, the Plan further aligns the
interests of shareholders and Executive Directors.
The rules of the PSP allow awards to be made over shares up to 150%
of salary. In the year ended 23 February 2008, awards were made to all
the Executive Directors except Mr Mason over Tesco PLC shares equal to
150% of salary. An award was made to Mr Mason over Tesco PLC shares
equal to 100% of salary.
For all the Executive Directors, awards over up to 100% of salary will vest
(together with reinvested dividends) subject to the achievement of Group
ROCE targets. The awards over the equivalent of a further 50% of salary
made to the Executive Directors other than Mr Mason will vest (together
with reinvested dividends) subject to the achievement of targets based
on International ROCE to incentivise and reward delivery of higher returns
from invested capital outside the UK (but excluding the US).
The first 75% of the awards will vest on a straight-line basis at the end
of the three-year performance period, with 25% vesting for baseline
performance and the full 75% vesting for maximum performance against
target. The target in respect of the first 75% of the 2007/8 PSP award is
achievement of 14.2% Group ROCE and 8.1% International ROCE (based
on profit before interest less tax) at the end of the three-year performance
period in 2009/10.
The remaining 25% of the award will vest for superior Return on Capital
performance. The Committee has agreed that it is appropriate to exercise
judgement on whether vesting should occur to encourage Executives to
make investment decisions in the long-term interests of the business
without being unduly influenced by the impact on the ROCE target. When
determining whether some, or all, of the remaining 25% of the award will
vest, the Committee will take into account a number of factors including:
> the level of ROCE achieved;
> the expected ROCE for additional and existing capital investment;
> whether capital spend is in line with strategic objectives and balances
short-term and long-term investment needs;
> sales growth and underlying profit growth; and
> whether this reflects other developments in the marketplace.
If the Committee exercises its judgement to allow some, or all, of the
remaining 25% of the PSP awards to vest, we will describe in the Directors’
Remuneration Report those factors taken into account in determining the
level of the award which would vest.
There is no re-testing of performance in respect of any targets.
Shareholder approval was obtained at last year’s AGM for the removal
of the requirement for any vested shares to be retained for a further
12 months.
Following the completion of the three-year performance period for the
2005/6 PSP award, the Committee considered the level of performance
against the target for the first 75% of the PSP award of achieving post-tax
Group ROCE of 11.7% by the end of FY 2007/8. Post-tax ROCE at the
end of FY 2007/8 was 12.9%, so full vesting will occur in respect of the
first 75% of the award. The Committee also exercised its judgement as
to the extent to which the remaining 25% of the PSP award should vest
as a result of superior ROCE performance, taking into account factors
including the level of ROCE achieved, the expected ROCE for additional
and existing capital investment, whether capital spend was in line with
strategic objectives and balanced short-term and long-term investment
needs, the level of sales and underlying profit growth and whether this
reflected other developments in the marketplace. Having considered these
factors in detail the Committee concluded that the whole of the remaining
25% of the award should vest.
US Long-Term Incentive Plan
The Group is seeking to build a substantial presence in the US which
in time has the potential to become a significant driver of value for our
shareholders. Integral to the success of this strategy will be recruiting
and retaining high quality management to run this significant business.
The Tesco PLC US Long-Term Incentive Plan 2007 (the US LTIP) has been
designed to deliver reward only if the US business delivers significant value
for shareholders.
The US CEO and other senior members of the US management team
have been made awards under the US LTIP. No other Executive Directors
will participate in the Plan. The maximum number of shares which may
be awarded under the US LTIP is 2 million shares to the US CEO and
1.5 million shares to any other participant. An award of 2 million shares
was made to Mr Mason, US CEO, in November 2007. Awards may be
adjusted to take account of any dividends paid or that are payable in
respect of the number of shares earned.
The extent to which awards will vest under the US LTIP will be conditional
on the financial performance of the Company’s US business, based on
the achievement of stretching earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)
and return on capital employed (ROCE) targets set by reference to the
US long-term business plan.