AMD 2008 Annual Report Download - page 49

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Establishing a system of discriminatory and retroactive incentives triggered by purchases at such high
levels as to have the intended effect of denying customers the freedom to purchase any significant
volume of processors from AMD;
Establishing and enforcing quotas among key retailers, effectively requiring them to stock
overwhelmingly or exclusively computers with Intel microprocessors, and thereby artificially limiting
consumer choice; and
Forcing PC makers and technology partners to boycott AMD product launches or promotions.
We requested the following findings and remedies:
A finding that Intel is abusing its market power by forcing on the industry technical standards and
products that have as their main purpose handicapping us in the marketplace;
A finding that Intel is wrongfully maintaining its monopoly in the x86 microprocessor market in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and treble damages to us in an amount to be proven at trial,
pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a);
A finding that Intel has made secret payments and allowance of rebates and discounts, and that Intel
secretly and discriminatorily extended to certain purchasers special services or privileges, all in
violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17045 and treble damages for our resulting lost
profits in an amount to be proven at trial;
A finding that Intel has intentionally interfered with our valuable business relationships to our economic
detriment and damages to us in an amount to be proven at trial for its resulting losses, as well as punitive
damages, as permitted by law;
Injunctive relief prohibiting Intel from engaging in any further conduct unlawful under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act or Section 17045 of the California Business and Professions Code;
An award to us of such other, further and different relief as may be necessary or appropriate to restore
and maintain competitive conditions in the x86 microprocessor market; and
An award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Intel filed its answer on September 1, 2005. On September 26, 2006, the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware granted the motion of Intel Corporation to dismiss foreign conduct claims. The effect of that
decision was clarified by the Court’s January 12, 2007 adoption of the Special Master’s decision on our motion
to compel foreign conduct discovery. As a result of these two decisions, we will be permitted to introduce
evidence of Intel’s exclusionary practices wherever they occur, including practices foreclosing AMD from
foreign customers or in foreign market segments. However, the court’s ruling limits our damages to lost sales in
the United States and lost sales abroad that would have originated from the United States. At a hearing on June 5,
2008, the court rescheduled the trial date from April 27, 2009 to February 15, 2010. The discovery process is
ongoing.
Other Related Proceedings
On June 30, 2005, our Japanese subsidiary, AMD Japan K.K., or AMD Japan, filed an action in Japan
against Intel Corporation’s Japanese subsidiary, Intel Kabushiki Kaisha, or Intel K.K., in the Tokyo High Court
and the Tokyo District Court for damages arising from violations of Japan’s Antimonopoly Act.
Through its suit in the Tokyo High Court, AMD Japan seeks damages, following on the Japan Fair Trade
Commission’s (JFTC) findings in its March 8, 2005 Recommendation, or the JFTC Recommendation, that Intel
K.K. committed violations of Japan’s Antimonopoly Act. The JFTC Recommendation concluded that Intel K.K.
interfered with AMD Japan’s business activities by providing large amounts of funds to five Japanese PC
manufacturers (NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Sony, and Hitachi) on the condition that they refuse to purchase AMD’s
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